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Abstract 
This paper estimates labor supply effects for informal caregivers in Sweden using four 
waves of the SHARE data panel. To give daily or weekly care to a parent, step parent 
or parent in law is found to be more common among women than among men and is 
associated with lower employment probability for daily caregivers although the causal 
direction of the relationship is unclear. No negative effect of caregiving is found on 
working hours. Further, no support is found for the hypothesis that reduced availability 
of public eldercare in Sweden has caused labor market consequences for caregivers 
to become more severe over time. The results from this paper raise the question if the 
substitution of public eldercare with informal care in Sweden has caused caregivers to 
carry the double load of both market work and caring responsibilities and which 
consequences this will have for gender inequality in the long run.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
This paper uses data from SHARE Wave 5 release 1.0.0, as of March 31st 2015 (DOI: 10.6103/SHARE.w5.100) 
or SHARE Wave 4 release 1.1.1, as of March 28th 2013 (DOI: 10.6103/SHARE.w4.111) or SHARE Waves 1 and 
2 release 2.6.0, as of November 29th 2013 (DOI: 10.6103/SHARE.w1.260 and 10.6103/SHARE.w2.260) or 
SHARELIFE release 1.0.0, as of November 24th 2010 (DOI: 10.6103/SHARE.w3.100). The SHARE data 
collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission through the 5th Framework Programme 
(project QLK6-CT-2001-00360 in the thematic programme Quality of Life), through the 6th Framework 
Programme (projects SHARE-I3, RII-CT-2006-062193, COMPARE, CIT5- CT-2005-028857, and SHARELIFE, 
CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and through the 7th Framework Programme (SHARE-PREP, N° 211909, SHARE-LEAP, 
N° 227822 and SHARE M4, N° 261982). Additional funding from the U.S. National Institute on Aging (U01 
AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, R21 AG025169, Y1-AG-4553-01, IAG BSR06-11 
and OGHA 04-064) and the German Ministry of Education and Research as well as from various national sources 
is gratefully acknowledged (see www.share-project.org for a full list of funding institutions). 
3 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. 2 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 4 
2. Background ............................................................................................................................ 5 
2.1. Defining informal and intergenerational care ................................................................. 5 
2.2. Eldercare from the 1960s to today .................................................................................. 5 
2.3. Political context ............................................................................................................... 8 
3. Theory and previous literature ............................................................................................... 8 
3.1. The decision to give informal care .................................................................................. 8 
3.2. Informal care supply of women and men ........................................................................ 9 
3.3. Estimated effects of intergenerational care on labor supply in other countries ............ 10 
3.4. Previous estimates for Sweden ...................................................................................... 11 
4. Purpose and research question ............................................................................................. 11 
5. Data and method ................................................................................................................... 12 
5.1. Dataset ........................................................................................................................... 12 
5.2. Variables ........................................................................................................................ 13 
5.2.1. Attrition analysis .................................................................................................... 15 
5.2.2. Informal care .......................................................................................................... 15 
5.2.3. Public eldercare ...................................................................................................... 16 
5.3. Estimation strategy ........................................................................................................ 16 
5.3.1. Estimating the effect on employment probability .................................................. 17 
5.3.2. Estimating the effect on hours worked ................................................................... 17 
6. Results .................................................................................................................................. 18 
6.1. The effect of informal caregiving on employment probability ..................................... 18 
6.2. The effect of informal caregiving on hours worked ...................................................... 20 
6.3. The effect of caregiving over time ................................................................................ 23 
6.4 Sensitivity analysis ......................................................................................................... 24 
7. Discussion ............................................................................................................................ 25 
7.1. Discussion of results ...................................................................................................... 25 
7.2. Outlook and policy development .................................................................................. 27 
References ................................................................................................................................ 29 
Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 31 
 
 
4 
 
1. Introduction 
In most societies the provision of eldercare is divided between four spheres: the public sector, 
the family or informal sector, the market or private sector and the voluntary sector. These sectors 
have been called the corners of the Welfare Diamond. Sweden has for long been characterized 
by a strong public involvement in eldercare as well as in other welfare services. Public eldercare 
has together with public childcare been seen as an important contributor to enabling a high labor 
force participation of women (Johansson et al. 2011:4). Beginning in the 1990s, however, public 
supply of eldercare has decreased and only partially been substituted with an increase in private 
supply. At the same time researchers and the public discourse are starting to recognize the 
prevalence and consequences of informal caregiving. According to The Swedish National Board 
of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen), the decision on eligibility for public eldercare should 
be based solely on individual need but as a consequence of tighter budgets in many 
municipalities the requirements to qualify for public care have in practice become stricter (SCB 
2006:416). In 2004 civil servants who were assessing qualification for public eldercare were 
being directed to investigate whether relatives of the individual could share the caring 
responsibility in one out of four municipalities. Johansson et al. (2011) argue that the 1990 
economic crisis and downsizing of municipal budgets resulted in what they call “a rediscovery 
of the family” as a supplier of eldercare. 
  
A body of literature (see for example: Bolin et al. 2008, Heitmueller 2007, Kotsadam 2011, 
Kotsadam 2012, SCB 2006 and Spiess & Schneider 2003) has estimated the labor supply effects 
of providing care to a family member. This paper adds to this literature by estimating labor 
supply effects for caregivers in Sweden with a focus on the role of gender and availability of 
public care. The regression analysis is based on four waves of the SHARE data panel ranging 
from 2004 to 2013 and uses panel data models to control for the potential endogeneity of 
informal care. The main findings are that informal caregiving is negatively correlated with 
employment probability and although the causal direction could not be tested, informal 
caregiving seems to be part of the structures which are associated with high unemployment 
rates in groups far away from the labor market. Further, informal caregiving is found to have 
no significant effect on working hours.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section will provide a background on informal care and 
its historical and political context, the third section introduces the theoretical framework and 
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previous research, the fourth specifies purpose and research question, section five describes the 
dataset and method followed by the sixth section presenting results from the regression analysis. 
Finally the seventh section provides a discussion of the results and an outlook on policy 
development. 
2. Background 
 
In this chapter I will explain what is meant with informal caregiving and how the term will be 
used in this paper. In the second part of the chapter informal caregiving and public eldercare 
will be placed in their historical and political contexts. 
2.1. Defining informal and intergenerational care 
 
Informal care can be defined as care provided regularly to a family member, friend or neighbor 
in or outside of the own household. The nature of this care can vary and researchers commonly 
include practical help which can be help with household chores and personal care, 
administrative help such as paying bills or help in contact with authorities and finally emotional 
support which is the important but elusive support given by just being there for someone (SCB 
2006: 436-437). This paper will focus on the type of informal care sometimes referred to as 
intergenerational care where the caregivers are adult children providing care for their aging or 
sick parents or both. This group has become increasingly recognized in both economic and 
welfare research since people in this group often combine informal care work and market work. 
I will henceforth use informal and intergenerational care as synonyms when referring to this 
group. Since informal caregiving can be a wide range of things from helping out with garden 
work once every second weekend to providing daily personal care to a severely impaired parent, 
the expected consequences for other parts of life will differ. I will adopt the framework of 
distinguishing intensive caregivers from regular caregivers which will be more carefully 
specified in Section 5.2.2. 
2.2. Eldercare from the 1960s to today 
 
The 1960s were the beginning of an expansion of publicly provided eldercare in Sweden. This 
constituted a shift where the state took over the main responsibility of the care for older people 
from the family and was part of a general expansion of the welfare state. The legally binding 
obligation to care for one’s parents was removed from the legislation. At the same time women 
were in increasing numbers entering the labor market and publicly provided child care was 
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becoming generally available (Johansson et al. 2011: 337). During the 1970s public eldercare 
continued to grow, with more places provided in nursing homes and home-help services. This 
expansion came to an end in the 1980s. The ratio of the 80+ population receiving any kind of 
public eldercare decreased from 62% to 37% between 1980 and 2012 (Szebehely & Ulmanen 
2012: 11). This decrease can only partially be explained by better health among the elderly and 
is rather a result of economic downsizing and political priorities (Thorslund 2010: 402). In 
particular among the oldest (80+) the improvements in health have been relatively small and 
the reduced spending on eldercare seem to have resulted in a real decrease in access (SCB 2006: 
418). The period after 2000 has been characterized by a substitution of places in nursing homes 
for home-help services, see Table 1. Since the average receiver of home-help services receives 
considerably less care counted in hours than the average person living in a nursing home this 
indicates that the total amount of publicly provided eldercare has decreased (Szebehely & 
Ulmanen 2012: 11).  
  
Table 1. Development of eldercare in Sweden 
 
Persons who have a decision on home-help services, Sweden, both sexes, Age 80+ 
 
  2004 2007 2011 2012       
Amount 95 300 110 698 117 390 118 698       
Proportion in % 20 22,5 23,6 23,8       
        
Persons who live permanently in a nursing home, Sweden, both sexes, Age 80+ 
 
Amount  83 300 76 143 72 324 70 336       
Proportion in % 17 15,5 14,5 14,1       
                
Source: Own calculations from National board of health and welfare official statistics. April 2015.     
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Figure 1. Development of public eldercare in Sweden, from Thorslund 2010: 400, 
translated and adjusted. 
 
In a simple model the number of 80+ people can be seen as an indicator of demand for eldercare 
whereas the amount of people receiving home-help services and living in nursing homes can be 
an indicator of supply. Within this framework the reduction in places in nursing homes has 
potentially created a wedge between demand and public supply since the population aged above 
80 has increased (Thorslund 2010: 400. See also Figure 1). Has this gap been filled by the other 
main corners of the welfare diamond: private and informal care? Data from the Swedish living 
condition survey (ULF) conducted by Statistics Sweden shows that between 2003 and 2010 the 
proportion of the elderly who received only public eldercare and no informal care decreased 
from 24% to 12%. Further, the proportion who combined public eldercare and informal care 
increased from 21% to 32% and the proportion who received only informal care increased from 
27% to 31% (Szebehely & Ulmanen 2012: 16). This indicates a substantial shift from formal to 
informal eldercare during the last decade. Privately bought help also increased during this 
period, from 10% to 15%1, but amounted to a smaller proportion of the total care and was 
mostly used in groups with higher education (ibid: 16 and 18). 
                                                 
1The numbers for private care are upper boundaries since also other unspecified care was included in this 
category. 
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2.3. Political context 
 
Alongside this development came an increasing recognition of and reliance on informal 
caregivers during the 1990s and 2000s from Swedish authorities. Johansson et al. (2011) have 
analyzed how the role of the family as provider of eldercare was being redefined in the 1997 
Social services act. Family caregivers were now to be regarded as valuable resources and to be 
offered the support they needed to be able to continue to care for their next of kin. In focus of 
the new directives were that the municipal authorities now were given a responsibility to raise 
awareness and show appreciation of caregivers, improve their quality of life by providing 
needed support and to reduce the risk of burnout by offering training and mentoring (Johansson 
et al. 2011: 343). Simultaneously, caregivers were becoming increasingly organized in groups 
who demanded more recognition and support (Ibid: 345). To some degree this represents a 
policy direction where substitution of public eldercare with informal caregiving is being 
encouraged, and where the potentially negative consequences should be countered by the 
municipalities. 
3. Theory and previous literature 
 
Within the economics research there has been an increasing interest for the labor market effects 
of informal caregiving. This section will present the theoretical framework and previous 
literature. 
3.1. The decision to give informal care 
 
Starting out in a basic labor market participation decision we can assume a currently employed 
individual with a time constraint who has a parent in need of care. The allocation of time 
between market work, informal caregiving and leisure will then be a utility maximization 
problem where the individual weights the assumed positive utility derived from giving help 
against the time allocated to this task at the expense of leisure and market work. Hence, the care 
need of the parent potentially raises the reservation wage of the individual. If the care need is 
minor the help could probably be provided without interfering on market work through a 
reduction of leisure while a substantial care need would be more time consuming and potentially 
cause the individual to reduce her working hours or even exit the labor force. In this framework 
the allocation of time to informal care, leisure and market work can be expected to depend on: 
opportunity costs for the individual (e.g. foregone market wage, household income), individual 
9 
 
and family characteristics (e.g. family relations, number of siblings to share the care 
responsibility), possibilities to successfully combine informal care, market work and leisure 
(e.g. work hours flexibility, geographical proximity to parents), availability of substitutes to 
informal care (e.g. supply and/or price of public and private alternatives) and social norms and 
expectations on the individual. 
3.2. Informal care supply of women and men 
 
Many studies which have estimated the prevalence of informal care find that it is more common 
that women provide care to their parents and that women also provide more hours of care than 
men (Swedish National board of health and welfare 2012, Szebehely & Ulmanen 2012 and 
SOU 2014: 28). However, the results differ substantially between studies, and it is likely that 
they are highly dependent on how the survey questions are formulated. A general tendency 
seems to be that the gender gap in providing informal care is estimated to be larger if the 
receivers of care are asked than if the potential caregivers are asked. Because of gendered norms, 
there is a risk that women are more likely to understate their own caregiving than men are (SCB 
2006: 437). Therefore, studies based on survey questions specifying specific care tasks might 
result in smaller bias due to systematic differences in the interpretation of questions. 
 
Based on the above labor supply model I find two main explanations for a systematic divergence 
in informal caregiving of men and women. First, women on average earn lower wages than 
men2 resulting in lower opportunity costs for providing care. Second, norms regarding domestic 
work and care work as female responsibilities are, although perhaps less so in Sweden than in 
most other countries, nevertheless persisting and potentially influencing individual decisions. 
Evidence for both these explanations is found by Haberkern et al. (2015) who use the SHARE 
data panel to model the factors affecting the decision to provide informal care and the gender 
gap in European countries. They find that possibilities to provide care such as wages and 
geographical proximity to parents matter, but even holding these constant, women provide more 
care. Further, they find that the gender gap is larger in countries where the family is an important 
welfare provider, conservative values are prevailing and where public supply of eldercare is 
small.  
                                                 
2 In 2013 Swedish women earned on average 87% of men’s earnings according to Statistics Sweden. 
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3.3. Estimated effects of intergenerational care on labor supply in other 
countries 
 
Are there reasons for concern about gender inequality in informal care? Returning to the utility 
maximization problem above, there is a risk that inequality in informal care spills over to an 
increasing gender inequality in the labor market if informal care interferes with market work. 
A number of studies have estimated the effects of supplying informal care on labor market 
outcomes, commonly measured as employment probability, number of hours worked and wages. 
Most of the studies published in the US and the UK have found significant negative effects on 
labor market outcomes and especially so for intensive caregivers (Kotsadam 2012: 2). An 
overview of this literature is provided in Lilly et al. (2007). Within the labor economics 
literature there is an ongoing discussion about the potential endogeneity of informal care. 
Evidence of a causal negative effect of informal caregiving on labor supply has been questioned 
(see for example: Lilly et al. 2007, Heitmueller 2007) arguing that the caregivers could be self-
selecting individuals who already have a weak attachment to the labor market.  
 
Studies conducted in the European countries also find negative marginal effects of caregiving 
on the labor supply. Three studies by Bolin et al (2008), Kotsadam (2011) and Spiess and 
Schneider (2003) take on a comparative approach in which they estimate if the effects differ 
across European countries. Bolin et al. (2008) control for potential endogeneity by using an 
instrumental variables (IV) approach where caregiving was instrumented with parental health 
and age, distance to parents and number of brothers and sisters. Kotsadam (2011) uses fixed 
effects estimation and Spiess and Schneider (2003) use a type of difference in differences 
estimator. Bolin et al. (2008) use the first wave of the SHARE data set and find general negative 
effects on labor supply but no systematic differences between southern and northern Europe. 
Kotsadam (2011) however, finds that the negative effects on labor supply in general are stronger 
in southern than in northern European countries and that the effects are weaker for countries 
with more formal care when using data from the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP). Similarly, Spiess and Schneider (2003) who also use ECHP data find that increasing 
care hours result in fewer hours worked among women in southern but not northern Europe. 
Their proposed explanation is that since family norms are weaker in northern Europe and public 
care is more generally available the decision to provide care is more voluntary in northern 
Europe and can therefore be avoided when it would interfere with market work and thus incur 
a high cost on the individual. This hypothesis is also supported by evidence from a study in the 
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UK which shows that the degree of freedom in the caring decision is an important factor in 
explaining the strength of the labor market effects (Heitmueller 2007: 557). These comparative 
studies indicate that norms and availability of public care might not only matter for the decision 
to provide care but also for the magnitude of the effect on the individual labor supply. Kotsadam 
(2012) estimates the labor supply effects of informal caregiving in Norway using IV. Using age, 
health and care need of the parents as well as a dummy variable for living together with at least 
one parent as instruments he found no significant effects on employment probability for normal 
caregivers. However, to be an intensive caregiver, here defined as providing care more than 20 
times per month, was found to reduce employment probability by 6 to 8 percentage points. No 
significant effects were found on working hours for either regular or intensive caregivers. The 
author concludes that the high availability of public care in Norway could explain the relatively 
modest labor supply effects.  
3.4. Previous estimates for Sweden 
 
In the Swedish context there is relatively little research on the labor supply effects of informal 
caregiving. To my knowledge there is only one study, SCB (2006), which has gone beyond 
simple correlations in an attempt to quantitatively explain the effect on employment probability 
for caregivers while controlling for age and household type. Using cross-sectional data from 
The Swedish Living Conditions survey of 2002/2003 they find significant negative correlations 
between caregiving and employment probability for women and no effect for men. 
 
In a survey study in 2013 (SOU 2014: 28 and 139) a sample of 3630 respondents were 
specifically asked questions about informal caregiving and whether it had interfered with 
different aspects of their lives such as personal health, leisure and market work. As caregivers 
were classified those who answered yes to having given a relative, neighbor or a friend help 
with at least one out of seven specified care tasks at least weekly. Similarly to results from 
previous studies on SHARE data caregiving was found to be as common among men as among 
women but women provided more hours of care (Ibid: 140-143). Further, 12% of the female 
caregivers and 8,9 % of the male caregivers answered that they had reduced their working hours 
as a result of their caregiving responsibilities (Ibid: 148). 
4. Purpose and research question 
The mechanisms of informal care are important to understand since they help in constructing 
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policy that both meet the challenges of increasing demand for eldercare associated with an aging 
population as well as the aim of keeping labor supply high. Comparative cross-sectional studies 
indicate that the availability of public eldercare might be important in explaining the labor 
market effects for informal caregivers. Sweden is an interesting case since the level of public 
care seems to have decreased over the last two decades. This will be used to highlight the role 
of public eldercare in explaining labor supply effects from caregiving.  I will start by estimating 
the labor supply effects of being an informal caregiver for a Swedish sample. The two 
independent variables will be hours worked and employment probability. I will then proceed to 
test whether the effect of informal care on labor supply has changed over time as supply of 
public eldercare seems to have decreased. The results will be used in a discussion on how far 
we have come and what we still need to understand better to be able to give empirically founded 
policy advice about informal caregiving in a Swedish context as well as how informal 
caregiving relates to gender inequality.  
5. Data and method 
In this chapter the dataset, variables and estimation strategies used in the regression analysis of 
the effect of informal caregiving on labor supply are presented. 
5.1. Dataset 
 
This paper uses the Swedish subsample of the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in 
Europe (SHARE) data panel. It is based on interviews with respondents aged above 50 in twenty 
European countries. The panel contains four waves, with interviews conducted in 2004, 2007, 
2011 and 2013. The SHARE data panel contains questions about various kinds of help and care 
given to others as well as suitable control variables.  
 
Before proceeding to a more thorough description of the dataset I will assess the appropriateness 
of using a sample limited to individuals over the age of 50. First, intergenerational caregiving 
is likely to become increasingly common in this age as the care need of the parents will become 
high when they approach their 80s which speaks for the relevance of using this sample. 
However, as discussed in Bolin et al. (2008), restricting the sample to 50+ individuals risks 
excluding those who already stepped out of the labor force before the age of 50 to care for a 
parent. In a Swedish context, however, this can probably be expected to be a very small fraction 
of the caregivers. It has also been shown that the correlation coefficients between caregiving 
13 
 
and employment probability were more negative at lower ages for a European sample 
(Kotsadam 2011: 124). To conclude, using a sample restricted to 50+ individuals might result 
in estimated weaker employment effects than using a sample that includes also younger 
individuals. This should be considered when evaluating external validity and even though the 
differences are not likely to be very large in a Swedish sample the results of this paper should 
be regarded as lower boundaries. 
5.2. Variables 
 
The original sample included 12 280 observations. I restricted this sample to individuals who 
had not yet retired and excluded all respondents above 79 years3 . Also all individuals who 
answered that they were in paid employment but worked zero hours per week were excluded4. 
These restrictions resulted in a loss of more than half of the observations and the working 
sample now consisted of 4364 observations. The main reason for the fall in observations was 
that a large proportion of the above 50 population are already retired. Table 2 presents summary 
statistics for the variables which were included in the regression analysis. The dependent 
variables employed indicate whether the individual i answered that she or he was in paid 
employment at time t and lnhours indicate the log of hours worked per week5. Informal care is 
indicated by the binary variables care and icare which are described below. The control 
variables are: age which is continuous and equals current age of the respondent, woman, 
married, badhealth and highed are binary, where highed6 is equal to one if the respondent had 
finished more than 14 years of schooling and badhealth equals one if the respondents self-
assessed health was poor or very poor. The time variable year is equal to year of response minus 
2000 so that 2004 = 4 etcetera7. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Those in the age group above 79 years who answered that they had not yet retired consisted of 68 observations 
and excluding these from the regressions did not result in any significant changes in the estimated results. 
4 These were very few and most likely results of reporting errors 
5 Actually log of hours worked per week +1 since the log of zero is non-defined. 
6 Due to differences across the waves in how to measure education I have used the answers from the two waves 
which asked directly for number of years in education and assumed that it is time invariant which is not likely to 
be very restrictive in a sample of 50+ individuals. 
7 Resulting in the values 4,7,11,14. The reason a wave variable (1,2,3,4) is not used is that the number of years 
between the waves differ, with a gap between 2007 and 2011. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics of variables 
 
 
In the table, N refers to total number of observation and n is number of individuals. T-bar is N 
divided by n and hence refers to the average length of the panel. The table show that the mean 
of the employment variable is on a relatively expected level for this age group8 and the mean of 
log of hours worked is 3.63 which means that the mean of working hours was about 37.5 hours 
per week. Since theoretically employed could be equal to one even for very few working hours 
it is interesting to see how many of the observations (where employed=1) have few hours 
worked. Inspecting the sample showed that less than three per cent of the observations had 
fewer than 20 working hours per week and only one per cent had less than ten working hours 
                                                 
8 Total Unemployment levels in Sweden were relatively stable around 5% for this age group between 2004 and 
2013.  
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per week making it unlikely to cause any bias to the results. Continuing to the other variables, 
women are slightly overrepresented in the sample. Around half of the respondents are married, 
and twenty per cent have more than 15 years of schooling. Further, around two per cent state 
that their health is bad or very bad and the mean age in the sample is 59 years. It can also be 
noted that the variables employed, icare and badhealth have relatively low within variation9 
(and the icare variable has also low overall variation). This is a reason of concern since low 
within variation reduces the efficiency in fixed effects estimation.  
5.2.1. Attrition analysis 
 
Since the number of respondents differed across the waves both in the original and the working 
sample indicating that some individuals had dropped out from the panel and that new had been 
added an attrition analysis was performed to investigate whether this caused any distortion to 
the main variables. Investigating the means of the employed and lnhours variables separately 
for each of the waves indicated that the lnhours variable was stable across the waves but that 
the mean of the employed variable showed a weakly increasing trend over the period. This could 
reflect that unemployed individuals had a higher tendency to drop out of the sample since actual 
unemployment levels were relatively stable during this period. To avoid this causing a bias the 
time variable year was included in all regressions to account for this trend. None of the 
independent variables woman, care and icare showed any clear trend over the period. Hence, 
although there are indications that informal caregiving did increase in Sweden during the period 
this is not reflected in my sample. 
5.2.2. Informal care 
 
The binary variable indicating that the individual was a regular caregiver: care (intensive 
caregiver: icare) was constructed to be equal to one if the respondent answered that she or he 
had given a biological parent, step-parent or parent in law help with: personal care, practical 
household work or paperwork at least weekly (daily) continuously during the last year10. As 
discussed previously asking specifically for care tasks has the advantage of reducing the risk of 
systematic differences in interpretation of the term “giving care”. On the other hand it does not 
capture help that fall outside of these categories. Inspecting the distribution of caregiving in the 
                                                 
9 Within variation refers to how much a variable changes over time within an individual. Hence, the variable 
woman has zero within variation since no individual changed their sex between the waves while other variables 
such as employed  has above zero within variation since some individuals had changed employment status. 
10 Note that this definition is not the same as used by Kotsadam 2011, the reason is that SHARE survey does not 
ask specifically about care hours except for in the first wave. The definition is however the same as used in the 
survey study mentioned in Section 3.4. 
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sample showed that 12.2% of the women were caregivers and 1.6% were intensive caregivers. 
Among the men 9.9% were caregivers while 1.5% were intensive caregivers. Indicating that 
women are overrepresented among caregivers, but the differences are not very large. Note also 
that according to the definition used here all intensive caregivers are also regular caregivers. Or 
in other words, if icarei=1 then carei=1.  
5.2.3. Public eldercare 
 
A drawback of using the SHARE data panel in this context is that it does not include information 
about municipal residence of the respondents. This makes it difficult to control for the 
availability of public eldercare. Ideally resources spent on- or places per residents above 65 or 
80 years in nursing homes and home-care services in respective municipality would have been 
used. But since we do not know in which municipality the respondent or their parents resided 
the Swedish national average would have had to be used. This variable is at best a very course 
measure of the supply of public eldercare available to the respondent and instead time-care 
interaction variables were used, to estimate whether the effect of informal caregiving had 
changed over time as public eldercare decreased.  
5.3. Estimation strategy 
The effect of being an informal caregiver on labor supply will be estimated using the two 
following general relationships: 
 
1.  𝑝𝑟(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑)  =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟 + 𝑥𝛽 
2.  𝑙𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟 + 𝑥𝛽 
 
where caregiver is a binary variable equal to one if the individual gave informal care weekly or 
more often (care) or daily (icare) and x is a vector of control variables. Again, employed is a 
binary variable indicating if the individual was in paid employment and lnhours is the log of 
hours worked. To get a first view of the sample the models were estimated using pooled OLS. 
Then, assuming an error structure of 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 ,𝑡 where 𝛼𝑖 is individual specific and time 
invariant and 𝑢𝑖 ,𝑡 is iid, the relationships were estimated with panel data estimators. If the 
assumptions that  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 are random factors - independently and identically distributed over the 
individuals- and strict exogeneity of the explanatory variables hold, the random effects (RE) 
estimator will be consistent. However, since informal care could be endogenous this assumption 
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might not hold. Therefore the fixed effects (FE) estimator was also considered. It requires only 
that care and icare are uncorrelated with 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  which will be the case under the probable 
assumption that the unobserved heterogeneity comes from time invariant individual 
characteristics which will be captured in 𝛼𝑖  (Heitmueller 2007: 551-552). 
5.3.1. Estimating the effect on employment probability 
 
It was not possible to run fixed effects regressions for the employment model. A possible 
explanation is that there was not enough within variation in the variables care, icare and 
employment. To be able to exploit the between variation I therefore estimate this model using 
the RE logit estimator and following Kotsadam (2011) I also apply the Mundlak-Chamberlain 
(MC) approach to add the over-time means of all time varying regressors as additional control 
variables. This approach can be thought of as a middle way between the fixed effects and 
random effects models. The model maintains the assumption of strict exogeneity of all 
independent variables (including care and icare) conditional on 𝛼𝑖 but allows for arbitrary 
correlation with 𝛼𝑖 . Under these assumptions the error terms 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖 ,𝑡  satisfy 
𝐸(𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡) = 0  and 𝐸(𝑥𝑖′ 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡) = 0 (Wooldridge 2002: 323-324).  
5.3.2. Estimating the effect on hours worked 
 
Since only a small proportion of the individuals in the sample were informal caregivers the FE 
estimator which exploits only the within variation will be comparatively small (see Table 2 for 
within variation in care, icare, employed and lnhours).  
 
A possible way to improve the efficiency and to be able to estimate marginal effects of the time 
invariant control variables is to use the Hausman-Taylor (HT) estimator which creates internal 
instruments for time invariant as well as for assumed endogenous variables. Required 
conditions are that there are enough time varying exogenous variables to create instruments and 
that these correlate sufficiently with the time invariant variables. Under the assumption that the 
variables married, age, badhealth and year are exogenous 11  and time variant, the gender 
dummy woman is exogenous but time invariant, the education dummy highed is endogenous 
and time invariant and the caregiving variables are endogenous and time variant, the 
identification requirement is fulfilled. Correlation coefficients were calculated to give a first 
                                                 
11 Actually it is not obvious that civil status and health are exogenous to education levels. However, the 
endogeneity is not likely to be very strong and the effect of highed on employment outcomes is not of main 
interest in the analysis. 
18 
 
indication of the validity of the instruments and are shown in Table 3. Since it is not immediately 
obvious that the correlations are strong enough to produce unbiased estimates the consistency 
of the HT estimator should be tested against the FE estimator using a Hausman test. It should 
be noted that the caregiving variables care and icare are instrumented with their deviation from 
individual means which is equivalent to the FE approach.  
 
Table 3. Correlation coefficients for internal instruments and the time invariant 
variables woman and highed 
 
 
 
 
The empirical strategy is to run regressions using the RE, FE and HT estimators and to test the 
consistency of the potentially efficient but also potentially inconsistent estimators against the 
consistent FE estimator using standard Hausman tests. If the null hypothesis of no systematic 
difference between the estimates cannot be rejected, the RE or HT estimators are consistent and 
can be used.  
6. Results 
 
The results from the regression analysis are presented below with regression details in Table C 
in the appendix. The results from the pooled OLS estimation are presented in Table D in the 
appendix. The effects were fairly close to the panel model estimates but the Breusch-Pagan LM 
test rejected the null hypothesis of no panel effects. Therefore I continued to the panel 
framework in which all estimations were performed using individual clustered robust standard 
errors.  
6.1. The effect of informal caregiving on employment probability 
 
Regression results from estimating the effect of caregiving on employment probability are 
       woman    -0.0314  -0.0856  -0.0047   1.0000
   badhealth     0.0006   0.0203   1.0000
         age    -0.2018   1.0000
     married     1.0000
                                                  
                married      age badhea~h    woman
      highed    -0.1456   0.0013  -0.0088   1.0000
   badhealth     0.0006   0.0203   1.0000
         age    -0.2018   1.0000
     married     1.0000
                                                  
                married      age badhea~h   highed
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shown in Table 4. The marginal effects reported in the table are logged odds and to interpret 
these I raised e to the power of the coefficients to get odds ratios which are the odds of being in 
employment for a caregiver relative to the odds of a non-caregiver. An odds ratio equal to one 
indicates that becoming a caregiver does not change the odds of being employed. For the RE 
model the odds ratio for regular caregivers was about 0.84 (column 1) and the ratio for intensive 
caregivers was 0.28 (column 3) indicating that the odds of being in employment for a caregiver 
is 84% of the odds for a non-caregiver and for an intensive caregiver this relation is 28%. These 
are relatively strong effects, however only the effect for intensive caregivers was statistically 
significant and that only at the 10% level. This results from high standard errors which can 
likely be traced to the low variation in the employment and caregiving variables discussed 
above. Still, these results indicate that being an intensive caregiver is associated with 
significantly lower odds of being in paid employment compared to regular and non-caregivers. 
The effects of the control variables are of expected signs and magnitudes. In the MC regressions 
(columns 2 and 4) where means of time varying variables were added as additional control 
variables the estimated effects are still high, actually higher (these results should however been 
considered in the light of the very high standard errors). It does not seem to be the case that 
allowing for arbitrary correlation between the independent variables and the individual fixed 
effects has remedied the potential endogeneity problem which will be more carefully considered 
in section 7.1. I will now proceed to the results from the working hours regressions. 
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Table 4. Regression results from RE and Mundlak-Chamberlain (MC) estimation on 
employment probability 
 
6.2. The effect of informal caregiving on hours worked 
 
Table 5 displays the results of estimating the effect of being a regular or intensive caregiver on 
working hours. Both the fixed effects estimator (column 2 and 4) and the random effects 
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estimator (column 1 and 3) yield small and insignificant effects of care and icare. The control 
variables have expected signs. The Hausman tests12 rejected the null hypothesis of no difference 
and hence the consistency of the random effects estimator. Somewhat surprisingly the FE 
estimator has dropped the time effect due to collinearity. This omission is however not likely to 
cause a bias since the effect estimated by the RE and HT (see below) estimators yield significant 
but very small time effects.  
 
Table 5.  Estimation of effect of care and icare on lnhours using FE and RE estimator
 
 
Before interpreting these results I will proceed to performing the regression with the HT 
estimator to see if the efficiency of the estimation can be improved. The results are shown in 
Table 6. 
 
 
                                                 
12 See Table A in appendix for results from Hausman tests. 
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Table 6. Estimation of effect of care and icare on working hours using FE and HT 
estimator 
 
 
The HT estimates in Table 6 (column 2 and 4) are fairly in line with the fixed effects results but 
the Hausman test could not be conducted so I will stay with the fixed effects estimates 13. The 
effects from the FE regressions (column 1 and 3) should be interpreted as follows: had the 
effects been statistically significant, being a regular caregiver would have been associated with 
0.5% more hours worked and to be an intensive caregiver with 2.2% more hours worked. Hence, 
these results do not indicate that caregiving has a negative impact on working hours in Sweden. 
I will now proceed to test whether the effect of caregiving on hours worked has changed over 
time as public eldercare has decreased. 
                                                 
13 The HT models failed to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the test which is common in small samples. See 
Table B in appendix for test output.  
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6.3. The effect of caregiving over time 
 
The test strategy was to add interaction variables between the caregiving variables and year 
dummies in the regression to try to capture whether the effect of being an informal caregiver 
had changed over time. The interaction variables should be interpreted as the marginal effect 
on working hours of being a caregiver for each of the years with 2004 as the reference year. 
Hence, they also potentially capture other time varying effects not included in the model. Only 
if all other factors which can be expected to affect working hours remained constant over the 
period, the effect captured by these care-time interaction variables will be equivalent to the 
effect of decreased public eldercare. Although this is unlikely to hold perfectly, the trend of 
reduced public eldercare seems to have been relatively strong and comparing effects over time 
could give an indication of its importance. The results presented in Table 7 show that only one 
of the interaction variables was significant (icare in year 2011) and no trend of increasing 
negative impact on working hours was found for either regular (column 1) or intensive 
caregivers (column 2). There rather seems to be a weak trend in the opposite direction but the 
effects are small and mostly insignificant. Hence, there is no evidence that the effect of being 
an informal caregiver on hours worked had changed over the period. 
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Table 7. Effect of caregiving on working hours with time interaction variables 
 
6.4 Sensitivity analysis 
 
To test whether the effect of care was driven by those individuals in this variable who were 
giving daily care I re-estimated the models using the variable wcare = care - icare which then 
included only regular caregivers. For the lnhours regression the effect of wcare was very close 
to the effect of care indicating that this was not the case. For the employment regression the 
estimated effect of wcare was significantly smaller than the effect of care indicating that the 
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strong negative effect on employment probability indeed seems to be driven by the intensive 
caregivers. The regression results are presented in Table E in the appendix. 
 
Finally it could also be argued that on top of informal care being more common among women, 
the marginal labor market effects from providing informal care could also be more severe than 
for men. An argument for this to be the case is that it could be more socially acceptable for 
female caregivers to reduce their working hours or quit their jobs than it is for their male 
counterparts. To test this I ran fixed effects regressions on lnhours separate for men and 
women14. The regression output is found in Table F in the appendix. The results yielded that 
being an informal caregiver had no significant effect on hours worked in neither the female nor 
the male subsample and that the differences in the estimated effects were small.  
7. Discussion 
The purpose of this paper was to estimate the effect of informal caregiving on employment 
probability and working hours and to test the hypothesis that the effects have become more 
severe over time as public eldercare has become less available. A discussion of the results and 
an outlook on the political context, future research and policy development follows below. 
7.1. Discussion of results 
 
Beginning with the effect on employment probability, the results from the regression analysis 
are ambiguous. The RE logit estimates indicate a negative correlation between employment 
probability and informal caregiving, but it was not possible to test to which extent this 
correlation was driven by caregiving being endogenous since no fixed effects estimation could 
be conducted. In a UK study, Heitmueller (2007) shows that for panel data the estimated effect 
of informal caregiving on employment probability is upward biased, and – as in my results – 
very high, when not controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. He concludes that this 
endogeneity potentially reflects that caregivers often belong to a vulnerable group on the labor 
market. Therefore, increasing the supply of public eldercare might not be efficient in bringing 
these groups into work. The endogeneity indicates that the unemployment does not seem to 
stem directly from involuntary caregiving provided to substitute for public eldercare. He argues 
that policy should instead be targeted at enhancing the skills and employability of these groups 
                                                 
14 Since the variation in the caregiver variables and the employment variables was already low it did not seem 
meaningful to divide the sample for the employment regression. 
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in general. 
 
Since endogeneity could not be tested for, the results from my study cannot confirm or reject 
that informal caregiving in Sweden causes any large reductions in employment probability in 
general. However, the results indicate that, at least for groups with an already weak attachment 
to the labor market, caregiving seem to be one of the mechanisms decreasing the likelihood of 
being in or returning to paid employment and thus part of the complex combination of many 
factors reducing employment probabilities in these groups. For example caregiving could be 
something a currently unemployed individual does for a period because she or he has the time, 
but eventually this care might become indispensable which would reduce the possibility of 
reentering the labor market.  
 
Proceeding to the relationship between caregiving and working hours no significant effect was 
found for either regular or intensive caregivers. These results are in line with results found for 
Norway (Kotsadam 2012). A possible explanation for the case that the labor supply effects seem 
weaker than theory would suggest is that some individuals might have bought private eldercare 
to substitute for public eldercare. These are then most likely those individuals who have to lose 
the most from giving informal care, e.g. people with high incomes and/or non-flexible work 
hours. Such a substitution would dampen the estimated average labor market effects of 
caregiving. Proceeding to the over-time effects of caregiving it is difficult to draw any 
conclusions since the direct effect of availability of public care could not be isolated from the 
general time effect. However, nothing in the estimation results indicates that the labor supply 
effects of informal caregiving have become more severe as a result of lower availability of 
public eldercare and a lower degree of freedom in the caregiving decision. 
 
The results of this paper are fairly in line with results for Norway and northern European 
countries from studies using similar methods which also find weak or no labor supply effects. 
The estimated effects are however contradicting to the results found in the Swedish survey study 
presented in section 3.4. where 12% of the female and 8.9% of the male caregivers answered 
that they indeed had reduced their working hours as a result of their caregiving tasks. Since that 
study included help given to spouses and disabled children the results are not directly 
comparable as this help tends to be more time intense and hence to have a comparatively strong 
effect on labor supply. In their sample one out of ten caregivers was giving help to a spouse or 
a child under the age of ten while 60 % gave help to a parent (SOU 2014: 28 and 150). Hence 
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it seems unlikely that the entire difference in the results is attributable to the inclusion of this 
group. Further it has been shown that for SHARE data, the inclusion of spouses living in the 
same household caused virtually no change in the size of the caregiving coefficient (Bolin et al. 
2008: 735). Instead different methods – direct survey questioning or quantitative inference from 
observed behavior – probably capture different aspects of the complicated mechanisms 
involved in the individual choice of informal caregiving.  
7.2. Outlook and policy development  
 
Reduced availability of public eldercare combined with comparatively high expectations on 
Swedish women to work in the market could explain why informal caregiving seems to be 
increasing without any large reductions in labor supply. If the results of this paper hold, it 
becomes evident that a growing group of people in Sweden are working double. Running the 
sample separately for men and women indicated that marginal effects do not differ substantially 
between women and men. Hence, the main driver of gender inequality from informal caregiving 
in Sweden seems to be that more women than men are caregivers and hence might carry a 
double workload. Returning to the theoretical model of labor supply, increasing informal care 
work while holding market work constant can only be done at the expense of foregone leisure. 
Aside from how equitable it is that society is placing such a heavy weight on this group it is 
difficult to see how it can be a sustainable solution. It seems reasonable to assume that leisure 
will be sacrificed in a first stage when the individual spends more hours on informal care. 
Studies confirm that informal caregivers in Sweden to a higher extent experience difficulties to 
find time for themselves and their needs (SCB 2006: 454-456) and that caregivers to some 
degree use vacation days and unpaid temporary leave to give care (SOU 2014: 28 and 147). In 
a second stage the stress and tiredness from double working could result in a reduction of market 
work.  
 
Based on the findings of this paper it cannot be confirmed that the decreasing level of public 
eldercare and the increase in informal caregiving has come with a labor supply price, but better 
data is required to further investigate the relationship between informal caregiving and 
employment probability while controlling for endogeneity. Further, theory suggests that labor 
supply should eventually suffer in the long run if the trend with decreased supply of formal 
eldercare continues. Further research explicitly including variables indicating public and private 
availability of eldercare could help clearing the picture for the future. 
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What guidelines do these results provide to municipalities struggling with tight budgets and 
high unemployment? The good news are that cutting in the budgets to eldercare does not yet 
have seem to have caused large reductions in labor supply but the risk still prevails that this will 
happen if further reductions are made. More worrisome are the indications that a growing group 
of people are carrying the demanding task of combining care work and market work. This raises 
the question of economic compensation to caregivers. However, such a compensation is likely 
to create further incentives for substituting market work with care work if the compensation is 
extensive. This is the same critique as has been directed towards financial compensation for 
staying at home with a child15. There seems to be an inherent dilemma in this question and more 
research is warranted to give good policy advice. However, the results in this paper show that 
any Swedish government or municipality concerned with labor force participation and gender 
equality need to take informal caregiving into account when constructing eldercare and labor 
market policy. Meanwhile, the new center-left (social democratic and green party) government 
seems to have begun a policy shift towards moving back from informal to formal eldercare. In 
the 2015 spring budget proposition increased resources to public eldercare were motivated with 
that it will help female caregivers who have reduced their working hours to choose more market 
work (Swedish government 2015). The same argument can be used to argue for increasing 
privatized supply of eldercare, organized in the quasi-market form where each user is subsidized 
by the municipality which is aimed at securing equal access, user choice and create incentives 
for quality competition. The economics literature on public versus private organization in the 
health and welfare sector is vast. Also politically this dispute is in constant focus and the public 
can form their opinion based on empirical evidence and ideology. A return to the family 
however, whether it comes with labor market consequences or not, as a bearing pillar in 
eldercare has until now sailed under the radar and has constituted a conservative turn in liberal, 
progressive Sweden. 
 
                                                 
15 The policy which in Sweden has been called Vårdnadsbidraget 
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Appendix 
 
Table A. Results Hausman tests RE estimator 
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Table B. Results Hausman test HT estimator 
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Table C. Regression details summary 
 
 
lnhours 
N Clusters 𝝆16 R
2 within R2 between R2 overall 
REcare 3559 2288 .519  0.0146 0.0833 0.0698 
REicare 3559 2288 .519 0.0147 0.0834 0.0697 
FEcare 3559 2288 .664 0.0185 0.0348 0.0296 
FEicare 3559 2288 .664 0.0186 0.0349 0.0296 
HTcare 3559 2288 .524 - - - 
HTicare 3559 2288 .525 - - - 
FEcare  with 
time 
interactions 
3559 2288 .519 0.0150 0.0836 0.0703 
FEicare with 
time 
interactions 
3559 2288 .519 0.0146 0.0835 0.0698 
 
employed 
      
REcare 3772 2408 .684 - - - 
REicare 3772 2408 .697 - - - 
MCcare 3772 2408 .698 - - - 
MCicare 3772 2408 .697 - - - 
Sensitivity 
analysis 
regressions 
      
women 1875 1207 .743 0.0075  0.0216   0.0185 
men 1691 1086 .542 0.0425 0.0053   0.0195 
iwomen 1875 1207 .743 0.0075 0.0215 0.0184 
imen 1691 1086 .542 0.0425 0.0054 0.0196 
                                                 
16 Fraction of variance due to 𝑢𝑖 
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hours_w 3559 2408 .664 0.0185 0.0347 0.0295 
emp_w 3772 2413 .685 - - - 
Pooled 
OLS 
      
lnhours 
care 
3559 - - - - 0.0712 
lnhours  
icare 
3559 - - - - 0.0711 
employed 
care 
3772 - - - - 0.021617 
employed 
icare 
3772 - - - - 0.022518 
 
Table D. Estimation output for Pooled OLS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Pseudo R2 
18 Pseudo R2 
35 
 
Table E. Estimation output separating weekly caregivers 
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Table F. Estimation output from separate estimation men and women 
 
 
